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DETERMINING WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS
“TOUCH AND CONCERN” THE UNITED
STATES: JUSTICE KENNEDY’S FILARTIGA
Ralph G. Steinhardt *
INTRODUCTION
If statutes were zombies, the Alien Tort Statute of 17891 (ATS) would
lead the undead who walk among us. By one conventional narrative, the
statute arose from the misty eighteenth-century murk, then lay moribund for
nearly two centuries until 1980, when the Second Circuit breathed a strange
new life into it with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.2 That decision then remained a
* Arthur Selwyn Miller Research Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Law School. The author was co-counsel for the respondent in the Sosa litigation
and has on multiple occasions represented a group of international law scholars appearing
as amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs in alien tort cases, including the petitioners in the
Kiobel litigation (with Arin Brenner). He has also appeared as an expert witness in several
alien tort cases against multinational corporations and was co-counsel in Sison v. Estate of
Marcos.
1 Enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)), the Alien Tort Statute now provides that “[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at § 1350
note), extends Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), to U.S. citizens, providing
in pertinent part:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial
killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal
representative . . . .
2 630 F.2d at 876. In Filartiga, the Second Circuit found that deliberate torture under
color of law violated the law of nations and ruled that the ATS therefore provided subject
matter jurisdiction over a human rights claim brought by Paraguayan citizens against a
Paraguayan police official for torture that occurred entirely in Paraguay. Id. at 878. For a
powerful corrective to the conventional history of the statute and its interpretation, see
generally Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1467 (2014) (tracing the rise of the ATS as an accountability mechanism for torts committed by aliens).
1695
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“monstrous” curiosity3—generating more academic conferences than cases
and more awards of tenure than damages—until 1984, when the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic.4 The three-way split among the panel in Tel-Oren suggested that
there was no consensus that Filartiga had been rightly decided, and the death
watch began in earnest, even as the years passed and jurisdiction was sustained in numerous cases that fit the Filartiga model. This issue of the Notre
Dame Law Review, in assessing the impact of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,5
marks the thirtieth anniversary of the statute’s first premature obituary.
Like the proverbial reports of Mark Twain’s demise, it is easy to exaggerate the death of alien tort litigation in the aftermath of Kiobel. After all, the
Supreme Court there decided—unanimously for the second time in nine
years6—that the ATS does not provide jurisdiction in a high-profile case,
deploying a rhetoric of caution in the interpretation of this ancient statute.
Equally significant, the majority in Kiobel expanded the existing presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law,7 applying it for the first
time to a purely jurisdictional statute instead of substantive statutes like the
securities laws,8 antidiscrimination laws,9 and labor laws.10 The essential
problem with this approach is not that courts, litigators, and scholars failed to
anticipate the issue.11 To the contrary, over the decades since Filartiga, extraterritoriality and the related choice of law issues have frequently been front
and center at the pre-trial stages of ATS litigation.12 The problem with the
3 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 2 (2003).
4 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
5 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
6 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
7 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk for a Short
Drink, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841 (2013).
8 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
9 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 246–47 (1991).
10 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 290–91 (1949).
11 Cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent with
International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671 (2014).
12 The Filartiga court itself recognized that “[i]t is not extraordinary for a court to
adjudicate a tort claim arising outside of its territorial jurisdiction.” Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). The issue of extraterritoriality arose repeatedly in the
ATS cases involving various members of the Marcos family. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at i, Estate of Marcos
v. Hilao, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995) (No. 94-775) (asserting as one question for review
“[w]hether the Alien Tort Statute . . . applies extraterritorially”). In 1988, the Department
of Justice submitted a forty-page amicus brief arguing that the ATS should not apply to
cases between aliens involving conduct that occurred outside of the United States, an argument that was rejected by the Ninth Circuit. See Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos),
978 F.2d 493, 499–501 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction was not inappropriately exercised under § 1350 even though the actions of Marcos-Manotoc which caused a
fellow citizen to be the victim of official torture and murder occurred outside of the
United States.”). See generally David Cole, Jules Lobel, & Harold Hongju Koh, Interpreting
the Alien Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae Memorandum of International Law Scholars and Practitioners
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majority’s approach in Kiobel is instead that it contradicts the Supreme
Court’s own precedents and leaves the lower courts with precious little guidance in determining the circumstances under which the presumption
against extraterritoriality might be overcome in future ATS cases. In this
Article, I show that what guidance there is in Kiobel emerges not from the
majority opinion but from the concurrences, especially the cryptic single paragraph from Justice Anthony Kennedy.
I.

SOSA,

THE

PRESERVATION

OF

FILARTIGA,

AND

REVISIONISM 2.0

In Sosa, the Supreme Court determined conclusively that the ATS was
purely jurisdictional,13 an issue on which the lower courts had been divided
ever since Judge Bork’s separate opinion in Tel-Oren.14 It also ruled that the
statute had effect from the moment of its enactment.15 That was a critical
analytical move, because it meant that the ATS did not lie dormant until such
time as Congress might see fit to define and implement the norms that would
fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. To the contrary, even without that congressional action, the statute “enabled federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations
and recognized at common law.”16 In short, the Sosa Court established that
the ATS does not create a cause of action, but that it does recognize a cause of
action, derived from the common law, for certain violations of international
law: “The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time.”17 Sosa thus requires that the tort be “committed” in
violation of international law, not that international law itself recognize a
right to sue in domestic courts and not that Congress adopt implementing
legislation defining the wrong.
That the cause of action could be defined by the common law and not
by the law of nations is entirely consistent with the hornbook principle that
international law does not specify the means of its domestic enforcement.
The law of nations can define the underlying conduct as wrongful and establish the obligation to assure conformity without specifying a statute of limitations, the requirements of standing, or the precise contours of direct and
secondary liability. International law “never has been perceived to create or
in Trajano v. Marcos, 12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1988). In 2003, the Department of Justice renewed its argument from the Marcos and Sosa cases that no cause of
action could be inferred for wrongs that occurred outside of the United States. See Brief
for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 29–31, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628).
13 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
14 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
15 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
16 Id. at 712.
17 Id. at 724.
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define the civil actions to be made available by each member of the community of nations; by consensus, the states leave that determination to their
respective municipal laws.”18 “In consequence, to require international
accord on a right to sue, when in fact the law of nations relegates decisions
on such questions to the states themselves, would be to effectively nullify the
‘law of nations’ portion of section 1350.”19
In order to determine which international norms fall within the common law authority of the federal courts, the Sosa Court considered the state
of the common law in 1789, when the ATS was adopted, and identified three
paradigmatic torts that would have been actionable under the ATS without
further action by Congress or by the community of sovereign states: the violation of safe conducts, infringing the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.20
Explicitly rejecting Sosa’s argument that the actionable norms under the ATS
were frozen as of 1789, the Court ruled that the recognition of a claim under
the “present-day law of nations” as an element of common law would extend
to “norm[s] of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”21 What the actionable norms across the centuries have in common is a “specific, universal, and obligatory”22 character,
combined with the potential for personal liability; indeed, the essence of Sosa
is that the ATS authorizes federal courts to develop common law rules of
liability where the underlying abuse violates such a norm. This is precisely
what the lower courts had done, Sosa noted with approval,23 in Filartiga,24
Kadic,25 and In re Estate of Marcos.26 In fact, the Sosa Court did not question a
single case in which this demanding and traditional standard had been satisfied, other than the arbitrary arrest claim advanced by Alvarez-Machain
himself.
The Sosa Court thus recognized that the lower courts had sustained jurisdiction under the ATS only for certain egregious violations of international
human rights law.27 The Court urged caution in the judicial task of identify18 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 778 (Edwards, J., concurring). The Sosa Court cited Judge
Edwards’s opinion in Tel-Oren with approval. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
19 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 778.
20 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
21 Id. at 724–25.
22 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994).
23 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 & n.20.
24 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
25 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
26 Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1475.
27 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996) (torture, sexual
assault); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236 (torture, genocide, war crimes); Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1475 (torture, summary execution, arbitrary detention); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d
1322, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (genocide, torture, inhumane treatment, arbitrary detention);
Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (summary execution, war crimes); Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 CIV. 3627 (JSM), 1996
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ing actionable norms of international law, referring for example to the
enforceability of “only a very limited set of claims,”28 and “the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability.”29
Relatedly, it identified a number of case-by-case considerations that would
limit the adaptation of the law of nations to private rights of action.
Even as it acknowledged a cause of action for certain international law
violations, the Court in Sosa stated that “there are good reasons for a
restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should exercise in
considering a new cause of action of this kind.”30 These considerations
include: (i) a transformation in the prevailing conception of the common
law since 1789, from “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular
State but obligatory within it unless . . . changed by statute” into a body of
norms more made (or created) than found (or discovered);31 (ii) case-based
limitations on federal common law-making, especially the Erie Doctrine;32
(iii) the institutional preference for allowing Congress to create private rights
of action;33 (iv) the possibility of collateral consequences, especially the risk
of adverse foreign policy consequences; and (v) the Court’s lack of “congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the
law of nations, and modern indications of congressional understanding of
the judicial role in the field [that] have not affirmatively encouraged greater
judicial creativity.”34
This rhetoric of caution in Sosa was a dramatic new restriction on ATS
litigation only according to those litigants and scholars who had systematically exaggerated the reach of the ATS in the first place. After all, the federal
courts have routinely dismissed ATS claims that did not clear the high and
traditional evidentiary hurdle that a norm must be “specific, universal, and
obligatory.”35 In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,36 for example, the SecWL 164496, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) (genocide); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (summary execution); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 335 (S.D.
Fla. 1994) (arbitrary detention).
28 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
29 Id. at 724.
30 Id. at 725.
31 Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
32 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33 “While the absence of congressional action addressing private rights of action under
an international norm is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a right when it
creates a statute, the possible collateral consequences of making international rules privately actionable argue for judicial caution.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
34 Id. at 728.
35 Id. at 732 (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 449 (2d Cir. 2000)
(concluding that a United States corporation’s purchase or lease of property from a foreign government with full knowledge that the property had been unlawfully confiscated on
the basis of religion did not establish a violation of the law of nations by the corporation);
Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that fraud is not a
violation of the law of nations); Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
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ond Circuit affirmed that ATS claimants were required to allege a violation of
specific, universal, and obligatory norms.37 Without calling into question its
analysis in Filartiga or Kadic, the Flores court concluded that environmental
torts were not currently in violation of international law.38 From Filartiga
onward, plaintiffs have tended to lose in cases where their lawyers were overly
creative in asserting that a particular norm had achieved the status of customary international law but not in cases where the tort at the heart of the case
was committed abroad.39 On the other hand, the great bulk of human rights
claims that were justiciable pre-Sosa remain justiciable post-Sosa: torture,
genocide, extrajudicial killing, disappearances, arbitrary detention, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and slavery, inter alia. In Roe I v. Bridgestone
Corp.,40 the court ruled that allegations of child labor met the Sosa standard,
concluding that “[i]t would not require great ‘judicial creativity’ to find that
even paid labor of very young children in these heavy and hazardous jobs
would violate international norms.”41
In the aftermath of Sosa, revisionists and human rights advocates alike
claimed victory.42 Certain academics found incoherence, as though Sosa
were some jurisprudential Rorschach test, in which courts and litigants would
that international law does not address claims for loss of money from state lottery distribution system); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14–15 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that
corporations are not liable for torture in the absence of state participation); Maugein v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004) (stating that defamation is not a violation of international law); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D.
Cal. 1986) (concluding that full First Amendment freedoms do not exist at international
law).
36 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003), republished at 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).
37 Id. at 252.
38 Id. at 254.
39 See, e.g., Cisneros v. Aragon, 485 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a husband’s sexual abuse of his wife as a violation of the law of nations); Hereros ex rel. Riruako
v. Deutsche Afrika-Linien Gmblt & Co., 232 F. App’x 90, 95 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
the use of slave labor by companies in South Africa from 1890 to 1915 is not actionable
under the ATS); Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 774 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
safe conduct norm does not cover cross-border parental abduction of a child); Frazer v.
Chi. Bridge & Iron, No. Civ.A. H-05-3109, 2006 WL 801208, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2006)
(finding that the operation of a construction site absent a safety engineer does not violate
the law of nations); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 132
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that the use of herbicides in war is not prohibited by international
law), aff’d sub nom. Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104
(2d Cir. 2008).
40 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
41 Id. at 1022.
42 Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007) (finding in Sosa a confirmation of
the revisionist position), with William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question
of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007) (detailing how the argument of Bradley et al.
rests on a fundamental “misreading” of Sosa).
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find whatever they were predisposed to see.43 The self-styled “revisionists”
were fairly certain that they won Sosa, finding in the Court’s rhetoric of caution a complete vindication of their approach. But that interpretation
requires an Olympian detachment from the fact that “revisionist” arguments
were fully and passionately advanced by the government, by Sosa, and by
their amici in the litigation as fatal obstacles to Filartiga and its progeny. The
majority obviously rejected that position. Those arguments certainly do dominate Justice Scalia’s concurrence, but that is the only place that the petitioners’ full-throated “revisionism” is accepted. Indeed, most human rights
advocates think that they won the war and lost the battle in Sosa,44 because
the Court endorsed the power of federal courts to infer a cause of action
from customary international law—the very heart of Bradley and Goldsmith’s
“revisionist” attack on Filartiga.45 As Justice Scalia rightly observed, of the
hundreds of ATS decisions in the federal courts over the last quarter-century,
the only decision disapproved of by the majority was Alvarez-Machain itself,
suggesting that the hard-line “revisionist” critique of ATS litigation rested
more on caricature than portrait.
Because the post-Sosa nature of ATS causes of action is central to a
proper understanding of Kiobel, it must be emphasized that the ATS does not
authorize the making of substantive U.S. law or its application abroad—the
very “sin” to which the presumption against extraterritoriality is addressed.
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank,46 Congress had adopted a substantive
legal regime, which was then improperly projected into a foreign sovereign’s
territory when an alien plaintiff sued an alien defendant for conduct outside
43 See Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute, and
Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 22 (2007) (“The first wave of scholarly and judicial
reactions to the Sosa opinion is in and the ‘spinning’ has begun.”).
44 See, e.g., Sandra Coliver et al., Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using
International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 169, 171 (2005) (noting that although the Supreme Court held against the plaintiff
in Sosa, “it did so in a manner that does not appear to undermine the prior case law in
which claims [of international human rights violations] were found actionable under the
ATS”); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241,
2244–47 (2004); Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar”
for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 534 (2005) (“Sosa affirmed
the cautious approach adopted by most of the lower courts and left the door open for
current and future case that address the most egregious violations of international law.”).
45 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 837–876 (1997). For the effort
to recast revisionism after the Sosa decision, see Bradley et al., supra note 42, at 891–935.
For what I believe is a definitive repudiation of the newest version of revisionism, see generally Dodge, supra note 42, and Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S.
Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (2011). See also Anthony J. Bellia Sr. & Bradford R. Clark, The
Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 829–33 (2012); Steinhardt, supra
note 44, at 2279–83.
46 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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the territory of the United States.47 Other cases announcing and applying
the presumption against extraterritoriality also involved substantive statutory
regimes adopted by Congress.48 By contrast, after Sosa, the applicable substantive standard in ATS litigation must be international law norms comparable to the “18th-century paradigms [that the Supreme Court has]
recognized[,]” like piracy and attacks on diplomats.49 In other words, the
remedial exercise at the heart of ATS litigation distinctly does not—indeed
after Sosa, cannot—involve the application of substantive U.S. law abroad,50
and every court faced with the argument that the ATS does not apply to
wrongs committed in foreign territory rejected it, both before51 and after52
Sosa.
Sosa was what Morrison called a “foreign-cubed case,” in that it involved
an alien plaintiff, an alien defendant, and foreign conduct, and would have
been inexplicable if all ATS cases involving foreign conduct were for that
reason barred.53 To the contrary, as noted, the Sosa Court cited multiple
foreign-cubed cases with approval,54 including Filartiga,55 Kadic,56 and In re
Estate of Marcos.57 It is significant that the government’s brief in the Sosa
litigation explicitly invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality as a
reason to dismiss Alvarez-Machain’s case,58 but it was to no avail. The Sosa
Court did not even make extraterritoriality a factor in the impressionistic
47 Id. at 2883.
48 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991) (antidiscrimination statute); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (labor law).
49 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
50 Professor William Dodge has made this point forcefully. See William S. Dodge, Alien
Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Fallacy, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 35, 37
(2010).
51 See, e.g., Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 978 F.2d 493, 499–501 (9th Cir.
1992) (“[W]e are constrained by what § 1350 shows on its face: no limitations as to the
citizenship of the defendant, or the locus of the injury.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1980).
52 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 745–47 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc);
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 20–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A handful of dissenting judges have
accepted the argument. See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 798 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); Exxon Mobil,
654 F.3d at 71 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
53 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n.11 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
54 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732–33 (2004); see supra text accompanying
notes 23–26.
55 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
56 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
57 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994).
58 See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46–50, Sosa,
542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that “[section
1350] reaches a tort committed against an alien anywhere in the world” is “seriously mistaken” due to the presumption against extraterritoriality).
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determination of whether a cause of action would be inferred59—let alone
whether jurisdiction was proper or whether a claim had been stated.
In summary, Sosa struck a careful balance between assuring a forum for
the advancement of claims like those in Filartiga, Kadic, and In re Estate of
Marcos, and closing the door to overly creative applications of the ATS, with
the result that excessively restrictive interpretations of the statute and excessively expansive ones are equally disapproved. But Sosa does put to rest
whatever controversy may have existed about the legitimacy of the Filartiga
paradigm, in which the survivors of human rights abuse may sue individual
defendants for the tortious effects of conduct deemed wrongful under the
demanding and traditional standards of international law.60
II.

KIOBEL: NARROW HOLDINGS + BROAD LANGUAGE = UNFORCED ERRORS

In Kiobel, the Supreme Court barred the Nigerian plaintiffs’ case seeking
relief against foreign corporations for violations of the law of nations outside
the United States. The Court explicitly based its decision on the fact that
Kiobel was a “foreign-cubed” case,61 a term of art traceable to Morrison and
referring to the fact that foreign plaintiffs were suing foreign defendants for
conduct that occurred entirely in foreign territory.62 Applying that rubric to
the facts of Kiobel, the Supreme Court emphasized that “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States”63 but established in the next sentence that the presumption against extraterritoriality might be overcome in
ATS cases “where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States . . . with sufficient force to displace” it.64
In other words, Kiobel’s unprecedented presumption against the extraterritorial application of purely jurisdictional statutes leaves open the possibility that the ATS might reach foreign conduct so long as it sufficiently
“touches and concerns” the United States. From that perspective, Kiobel
resolved the narrow case before the Court, on the particular facts alleged in
that complaint, without offering conclusive guidance on the resolution of
cases involving, for example, U.S. nationals as defendants, conduct within the
jurisdiction or control of the United States or performed under contract with
59
60
61
62
63
64

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–28.
See supra note 2.
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
Id. Section IV of the majority opinion in Kiobel reads in its entirety:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States.
And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States,
they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it
would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress
were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be
required.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the U.S. government, or other such linkages to the United States. Notably,
the brief of the United States on the question of extraterritoriality explicitly
preserved Filartiga and its foreign-cubed progeny even as it suggested that the
U.S. connections in Kiobel were simply too attenuated.65
The responsibility for defining the elements of Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test now falls to the lower courts, and they can be expected to generate
the next “cert-worthy” conflict among the circuit courts of appeals. The
exact phrase—“touch and concern”—appears in other legal settings.
Whether a covenant “runs with the land,” for example, depends in part on
whether it “touches and concerns” the land itself,66 although that has no selfevident connection to alien tort litigation. Another possibility based on the
exact formulation—“touch and concern”—is as an element of specific rather
than general jurisdiction.67 In Elemary v. Holzmann, for example, the court
ruled that:
A federal court’s jurisdiction over a person, may be either general—
“adjudicatory authority to entertain a suit against a defendant without
regard to the claim’s relationship vel non to the defendant’s forum-linked
activity”—or specific—authority “to entertain controversies based on acts of
a defendant that touch and concern the forum.”68

If this is what the majority had in mind, it seems eccentric to screen in
cases that touch and concern “with sufficient force,” instead of a test that
more naturally tests the relationship between a claim and a defendant’s jurisdictional contacts. Lower courts asked to apply the “touch and concern” test
have not embraced the specific jurisdiction gloss. Indeed, post-Kiobel, even
when the claim arises out of decisions made in U.S. territory by U.S. corporations, some lower courts have dismissed cases solely because the tortious conduct occurred abroad.69 Although that disposition is clearly erroneous for
reasons outlined below,70 at a minimum, it undermines the specific jurisdiction interpretation of the Kiobel test.
Chief Justice Roberts’s invocation of international principles71 in support of the “touch and concern” test is fundamentally anachronistic. His version of international law is its ancient “negative” form of jurisdictional linedrawing and abstention, instead of its contemporary “affirmative” forms of
substantive law for communal problems, like environmental degradation and
65 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 13–14, 19, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
66 See, e.g., Dryden v. Calk, 771 F. Supp. 181, 183 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
67 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Int’l Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d 927, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Ginsburg, J.).
68 533 F. Supp. 2d 116, 123 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Steinberg, 672
F.2d at 928).
69 See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 194 (2d Cir. 2013); Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103981, at *32–34 (N.D. Ala. July
25, 2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92937, at
*5–6, *17–18 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013).
70 See infra Section III.D.
71 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
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egregious human rights violations.72 For this reason, the Court’s international law touchstone—avoiding international strife—may not always cut in
favor of dismissing ATS claims with no territorial link to the United States.
The government of the United States made exactly this point in its brief to
the Filartiga and Kadic courts, urging the exercise of jurisdiction in those foreign-cubed cases, specifically to avoid diplomatic strife.73
The one thing that the Kiobel presumption cannot mean is that ATS
cases must be limited to tortious conduct within the United States. That
Kiobel does not create such a blanket rule is clear from the separate opinion
of Justices Alito and Thomas. They concurred in the judgment but would
have required that the “domestic [i.e., U.S.] conduct” of the claim must be
“sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.”74 In other
words, Justices Alito and Thomas insisted that ATS jurisdiction can be proper
only if the breach of Sosa-qualified norms occurs in the territory of the
United States. That standard would of course bar some of the most celebrated decisions in the history of ATS litigation, including those cited with
approval in Sosa itself, like Filartiga, Kadic, and In re Estate of Marcos. That the
other seven Justices in Kiobel did not adopt the Alito-Thomas restriction suggests in turn that foreign injury cases can survive, so long as there is a sufficient connection to the United States.75 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence,
providing a fifth vote for the Roberts opinion, explicitly confirms that the
ATS might still apply to “human rights abuses committed abroad” in cases not
covered by the “reasoning and holding” of Kiobel.76 In short, Kiobel cannot
provide a bright-line rule based exclusively on a territorial inquiry into where
the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred. Beyond that first principle, however, it is not
clear exactly what exactly Justice Kennedy had in mind, although he is now
the fulcrum of the Court in ATS cases. Doubtless cases involving alien plaintiffs, alien corporate defendants, exclusively foreign conduct, and foreign
injury with no connection to the United States are foreclosed, but the Kennedy concurrence reaches new heights in what looks like intentional obscurity. In its entirety, Justice Kennedy’s opinion reads as follows:
72 On the essential transformation of modern international law from a negative code
of abstentions into a code of affirmative and mutual obligations, see WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1964).
73 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21–23, Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090); Statement of Interest of the United
States, Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069).
74 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
75 From this perspective, the district court in CACI committed reversible error, applying the bright-line standard in the Alito concurrence as though it were the majority rule.
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92937, at *2 (E.D. Va.
June 25, 2013) (concluding that it “lack[ed] ATS jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because
the acts giving rise to their tort claims occurred exclusively in Iraq, a foreign sovereign”);
see also id. at *17–18.
76 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute. In my view that is a proper disposition. Many serious concerns with
respect to human rights abuses committed abroad have been addressed by
Congress in statutes such as the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
(TVPA), and that class of cases will be determined in the future according to
the detailed statutory scheme Congress has enacted. Other cases may arise
with allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and
holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of
the presumption against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation.77

This reference to “other cases” will remain cryptic until Justice Kennedy
decides to clarify it, but one of his first observations in the oral argument
suggests that he is prepared to distinguish an attenuated case like Kiobel from
a proper case like Filartiga:
[I] agree that we can assume that Filartiga is a binding and important
precedent, it’s the Second Circuit. But in that case, the only place they
could sue was in the United States. He was an individual. He was walking
down the streets of New York, and the victim saw him walking down the
streets of New York and brought the suit. In this case, the corporations have
residences and presence in many other countries where they have much
more—many more contacts than here.78

In other words, because Filártiga had no prospect of a meaningful hearing in
Paraguay and because Peña-Irala had in essence used the United States as a
safe haven, the ATS provided a forum of necessity. By apparent contrast, the
defendants in Kiobel were amenable to suit in a variety of places, including
Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. In addition, Filartiga
and its post-Sosa progeny clearly qualify as cases that involve “allegations of
serious violations of international law principles protecting persons,” and
they are not “covered . . . by the TVPA” because they involve allegations of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or the like.79 Nor are those
cases “covered . . . by the reasoning and holding”80 of Kiobel because they do
not involve foreign corporations, the foreign corporate defendants are not
merely present in the United States, or the claims have some other legal or
factual connection to the United States.
It is possible that Justice Kennedy’s vision of Filartiga is a tangle of doctrines generally kept separate, especially personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, subject matter jurisdiction, comity, corporate presence, and the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of substantive U.S. law.
On the other hand, it is also possible to suggest a coherent way out of the
chaos, namely using international law—including but not limited to interna77 Id. (citation omitted).
78 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
79 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80 Id.
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tional standards governing a nation’s jurisdiction to prescribe—to determine
which ATS cases “touch and concern” the United States and which do not.
Justice Kennedy has famously turned to international standards, especially in
the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and he is viewed as one of the Court’s “transnationalists,” in
Professor Harold Koh’s provocative characterization.81
So, what would Justice Kennedy’s use of international law look like in
determining which human rights cases “touch and concern” the United
States? At a minimum, that use of international law would update the majority’s obsolete fixation on the jurisdictional aspect of international law and
offer a compelling symmetry with Sosa. Just as international law defines the
positive substantive norms that are actionable under the ATS per Sosa, international law should define the positive jurisdictional reach of the ATS postKiobel and the kinds of claims it covers.
III. AS

A

MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHAT “TOUCHES
CONCERNS” THE UNITED STATES?

AND

International law, which from the beginning of the Republic has been
“part of our law,”82 and which must be considered in the interpretation of
federal statutes,83 offers one authoritative definition of which cases “touch
and concern” the United States. At a minimum, international law recognizes
and protects every state’s sovereign interest in the conduct of its nationals,
including corporations, even when their conduct occurs abroad. International law also clearly recognizes and guards the interest of every state in
protecting the integrity of its essential government functions, including the
detention of prisoners—wherever these functions may be fulfilled or
threatened. Equally clear, international law recognizes and protects the prerogative of a state to regulate conduct within its territory or within its jurisdiction and control. A fortiori, the conduct of an American corporation, under
contract with the United States government, for the performance of governmental functions like the treatment of detainees at a U.S. facility, necessarily
“touches and concerns” the United States. In addition, international law
independently recognizes the sovereign interest of every state in certain
grave violations of international law—including torture—and requires states
to provide a meaningful remedy for those who have survived such abuses,
whether at the hands of government actors or at the hands of natural and
juridical persons working under contract with the government. Domestic
courts should not place the United States in breach of its international obligations—and in disregard of its national commitment to the protection of
human rights—by denying even the possibility of a remedy for abuses of this
magnitude.
81 Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 52
n.67 (2004).
82 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
83 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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The Irreducible Sovereign Interest of a State in the Conduct of Its Nationals

Under international law, every sovereign is touched and concerned by
the conduct of its own nationals. According to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), nationality “constitute[s] the juridical expression of the fact
that the individual upon whom it is conferred . . . is in fact more closely
connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with
that of any other State.”84 One inherent consequence of the connection
between state and national (or citizen) is the applicability in principle of the
state’s laws to its nationals. International law refers to this prerogative of
sovereignty as a state’s “jurisdiction to legislate” (or prescribe) with respect to
its own citizens. In this respect, section 402(2) of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States is entirely consistent with traditional
and contemporary international authorities, providing, subject to certain reasonableness limitations, that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to . . . the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals
outside as well as within its territory.”85
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the conduct of U.S.
nationals—even when they live or act abroad—touches and concerns the sovereignty of the United States. In Blackmer v. United States, the Court observed:
While it appears that [Blackmer] removed his residence to France . . . it is
undisputed that he was, and continued to be, a citizen of the United States.
He continued to owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over him, and he
was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign country. Thus,
although resident abroad, the petitioner remained subject to the taxing
power of the United States. For disobedience to its laws through conduct
abroad he was subject to punishment in the courts of the United States.86

The Court noted explicitly that the case raised no issue of international
law because “[t]he Law of Nations does not prevent a State from exercising
jurisdiction over its subjects travelling or residing abroad, since they remain
under its personal supremacy.”87 The universal88 understanding of the prescriptive connection between every state and its nationals is sufficient to distinguish any ATS case involving U.S. defendants from Kiobel.89
84 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1987).
86 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (citation omitted).
87 Id. at 437 n.2 (citation omitted); accord United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98
(1922); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 369 (1824).
88 See 2 THE HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ORIGINAL MATERIALS 519
(John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 1966). The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the authority of The Harvard Research on matters of international law. See United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 685 n.31 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United
States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 396 n.17 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89 In the immediate aftermath of Kiobel, some district courts have rightly determined
that cases against U.S. citizens sufficiently “touch and concern” the United States to over-
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For these purposes, international law draws no distinction between natural and juridical persons: within the state of their nationality, corporations
are inarguably within the jurisdiction to prescribe. In some cases, corporate
nationality is a simple question of where the corporation is incorporated.
Thus, for example, the International Law Commission has determined—for
purposes of diplomatic protection—the same understanding that has governed jurisdiction to prescribe, namely that “the State of nationality [of a
corporation] means the State under whose law the corporation was incorporated.”90 As with natural persons, special cases may arise making the determination of a particular corporation’s nationality contestable,91 and a choice
of law rule may be necessary when more than one state’s law applies. But
none of that potential complexity undermines the essential connection of
the United States to the conduct of companies incorporated in the United
States.
B.

The Irreducible Sovereign Interest of a State in Conduct that Occurs Wholly or
Substantially Within Its Jurisdiction or Control

International law recognizes another category of cases that “touch and
concern” the United States to the extent that they involve conduct that
occurs within the territory of the United States or within its jurisdiction or
control. The territoriality principle of jurisdiction to prescribe may be considered the sine qua non of sovereignty: every state retains legislative authority
over conduct that occurs within its physical territory, meaning that it can
attach legal consequences to such conduct, even if its effects are felt somewhere else. In the ATS context, tortious conduct by a defendant within U.S.
territory in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States
would satisfy Kiobel, in which the Court found that none of the relevant conduct occurred in the United States. Tortious conduct in American territory
in violation of the law of nations would satisfy even the most demanding test
adopted by Justices Alito and Thomas in their separate concurrence in Kiobel.
Crucially, the international principle of territoriality is not limited to the
physical boundaries of a state but also includes areas within a state’s effective
control and jurisdiction. Famously that includes vessels on the high seas,
come the Kiobel presumption, even if the tort was committed abroad. Sexual Minorities
Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-cv-30051-MAP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114754, at *36–44 (D. Mass.
Aug. 14, 2013); Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117963, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by
No. 2:10-CV-00342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142538 (Oct. 2, 2013).
90 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries,
58th Sess., art. 9, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, Supp. No. 10 (2006).
91 Id. (“[W]hen the corporation is controlled by nationals of another State or States
and has no substantial business activities in the State of incorporation, and the seat of
management and the financial control of the corporation are both located in another
State, that State shall be regarded as the State of nationality.”).
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which international law treats as extensions of the flag state’s territory,92 and
special regimes that govern jointly administered areas or international condominia.93 Because international law recognizes the reality that the modern
world of jurisdiction is not divided neatly into territorially defined boxes, it
was no violation of international law when the Supreme Court determined
that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to U.S. military
facilities located outside of the United States.94 Applied to ATS cases postKiobel, these precedents suggest that services provided under a U.S. government contract and delivered at a U.S. military installation—completely under
U.S. military control though located in a foreign country—“touch and concern” the territory of the United States. Under international law, control of
that magnitude translates into effective jurisdiction, which translates in turn
into prescriptive authority, a legislative prerogative that reflects the international community’s conclusions about which matters touch and concern
which states. There is no doubt that Abu Ghraib was within the reach of U.S.
law as far as international law is concerned, and there is no principled distinction at international law that would exclude the application of the ATS
there.
C.

The Irreducible Sovereign Interest of a State in Its Essential Governmental
Functions, Whether Carried Out, or Threatened by, Nationals
or by Non-Nationals

Under principles of international law, the conduct of non-nationals may
also touch and concern the United States “with sufficient force to displace
the [Kiobel] presumption.”95 Specifically, international law has long recognized the legitimacy of a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to conduct outside its territory that involves its national security or essential
government functions, regardless of the actor’s nationality.96 This so-called
“protective principle” is sometimes oversimplified to cover only terrorism
and related crimes, but it also clearly covers extraterritorial conduct that
involves essential and routine government functions, like maintaining security, running detention facilities, controlling immigration, and minting currency, inter alia. In United States v. Bowman,97 for example, the Supreme
Court relied on the protective principle in a case involving a conspiracy to
defraud a corporation in which the United States was a stockholder, acknowl92 S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7); Geneva
Convention on the High Seas art. 6, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
93 See, e.g., The Antarctic Treaty arts. I & V(1), Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402
U.N.T.S. 71. See generally Vincent P. Bantz, The International Legal Status of Condominia, 12
FLA. J. INT’L L. 77 (1998).
94 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the detainee petitioners were in “a territory that, while technically not part of the United States, is under the
complete and total control of our Government”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
95 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
96 See generally IA SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 183–212 (11th ed. 1994).
97 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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edging “the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or
fraud wherever perpetrated.”98 Crucially, the protective principle covers foreign
conduct not only by the state’s own nationals but also by foreign citizens.99
The fact that ATS cases sound in tort and not criminal law does not diminish
the state interest in the conduct of those who operate under a government
contract, providing essential services instead of threatening them. In either
case, international law recognizes that a state is intimately connected to—
touched by and concerned with—the conduct of its contractors.
International law doctrines other than jurisdiction to prescribe reinforce
the necessary juridical relationship between contractors—regardless of citizenship—and the governments with which they do business. In its authoritative catalogue of the circumstances under which a state may bear
responsibility under international law, the International Law Commission
(ILC) concluded that: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”100
In its authoritative commentary to article 8, the ILC clarified that even
unauthorized or illegal conduct by a private actor can trigger the state’s
responsibility as a matter of international law: “[W]here persons or groups
have committed acts under the effective control of a State, the condition for
attribution will still be met even if particular instructions may have been
ignored.”101
Recognizing the potential for its own state responsibility internationally,
the United States requires that its contractors—regardless of citizenship and
location of service—operate in a dense regulatory environment, profoundly
controlled by the government itself. All of this qualifies as evidence of the
kind of contractor conduct that “touches and concerns” the United States.102

98 Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
99 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(3) & cmt. f (1987) (recognizing that a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe extends to
“certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests” (emphasis added)).
100 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 53d Sess., art. 8, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
101 Id. art. 8, at 48 cmt. 8.
102 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 804, 115 Stat. 272, 377 (expanding the United States’ special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction to include U.S. operated facilities overseas by amending 18 U.S.C. § 7 to
include “the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States
Government missions or entities in foreign States”); Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267
(2012)) (subjecting contractors to federal criminal prosecution).
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The Irreducible Sovereign Interest of a State in Grave Violations of
International Human Rights Law

At the time the ATS was adopted, Emmerich de Vattel was the most
influential international jurist, and he clearly articulated the communal
interest in assuring accountability for certain international wrong-doers:
[Although] the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the
punishment of crimes committed in its own territories, we ought to except
from this rule, the villains who, by the quality and habitual frequency of their
crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the
human race.103

The Supreme Court has clearly understood and vindicated that interest in a
variety of settings, especially those involving pirates and slave traders. In the
modern era, torture, genocide, and crimes against humanity make the perpetrators the enemies of all humankind because humanitarian disasters and
grave human rights violations respect no territorial lines.104 Because these
grave wrongs have international ramifications no matter what their domestic
location may be, there is the obligation of all nations to support and promote
the international order as the “society of the human race.”105 As acknowledged by the European Commission in its amicus brief in Kiobel, some
wrongs—no longer limited to piracy and slave trading—are “so repugnant
that all States have a legitimate interest and therefore have the authority to
suppress and punish them.”106
Modern international law recognizes that gross violations of human
rights touch and concern all nations, including the United States. The term
of art for such wrongs is that they are said to violate obligations erga omnes, of
legal interest to all states. The doctrine of erga omnes recognizes “the right of
a State to concern itself, on general humanitarian grounds, with atrocities
affecting human beings in another country.”107 In Barcelona Traction, Light
& Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain),108 the ICJ explained that erga omnes obligations may “derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles
103 1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 233, at 170 (reprinted ed. 1805)
(1758).
104 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169, 179, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
that nonconsensual medical experimentation with an anti-meningitis drug was a factor in a
polio outbreak in Nigeria, triggering an international outbreak spreading across much of
Africa and re-infecting twenty previously polio-free countries); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
105 2 VATTEL, supra note 103, § 35, at 211.
106 See Brief of the European Comm’n on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 16, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
107 South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 319,
425 (Dec. 21) (separate opinion of Judge Jessup).
108 Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
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and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination.”109
International law grants a wide measure of discretion to states to enforce
international law through their domestic judicial systems:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this
respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by
prohibitive rules . . . .110

In a more modern idiom, international law secures the sovereign authority of
a state to hold accountable those who violate a customary norm of human
rights law.
But international law goes further than simply allowing domestic
accountability: it requires states to provide a meaningful remedy against perpetrators. Vattel himself envisioned these state obligations with “respect to
great crimes . . . such as are equally contrary to the laws, and the safety of all
nations,”111 in which “[n]ations . . . are bound to observe towards each other
all the duties which the safety and advantage of that society require[ ].”112
And today, the erga omnes legal obligation imposed upon all states to participate in the prevention and remedy of gross violations of human rights by any
other state is well established.113 Equally significant, certain treaties include
provisions aut dedere aut judicare, which require states to “extradite or prosecute” those who violate the treaty, and there is an emerging understanding in
customary law that those who commit crimes against humanity are subject to
109 Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
110 S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). The ICJ
has continued to rely on the Lotus principle. See, e.g., Accordance with International Law
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion,
2010 I.C.J. 403, 415 (July 22); Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 238–39 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 15, 101, 135 (June 27); see also Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 77–79 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal) (stating that Lotus “represents a continuing potential in the context of jurisdiction”).
111 2 VATTEL, supra note 103, § 76, at 225.
112 Id. § 1, at 195.
113 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 199 (July 9) (finding that Israel’s violations of its erga omnes obligation “to respect the right of the Palestinian people to selfdetermination” and towards “certain of its obligations under international humanitarian
law” were “the concern of all States”); Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Judgment, 1996
I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11) (stating that “the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention [on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277] are rights and obligations erga omnes” and that “the obligation each State
thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the
Convention”).
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the same obligation even if it is not contained in a treaty.114 Historically, the
wrongs alleged in this case, including torture, have triggered the aut dedere
aut judicare obligation and therefore touch and concern the United States.
In the recent case of Belgium v. Senegal, the ICJ examined the obligation
of aut dedere aut judicare within the context of the Convention Against Torture, and clarified the nature and basis of the state obligation.115 The court
held unanimously that Senegal was required to take action to hold an individual within its territory accountable for violations of customary international
law norms.116 “State parties . . . have a common interest to ensure, in view of
their shared values,” that acts in violation of international human rights
norms “are prevented and that, if they occur, their authors do not enjoy
impunity.”117 Further, a nation’s obligation is “triggered by the presence of
the alleged offender in its territory, regardless of the nationality of the
offender or the victims, or of the place where the alleged offences
occurred.”118
The Supreme Court explained in Kiobel that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is designed to prevent “unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.”119 But immunity—or safe haven in the United States—for breaches of
international norms that satisfy Sosa, i.e. norms that are specific, universal,
and obligatory, also potentially disrupts diplomatic relations, even if the
essential wrongs were committed abroad. For this reason, the Court’s international law touchstone—avoiding discord—may not always cut in favor of
dismissing ATS claims with no territorial link to the United States.
IV. ONCE MORE WITH FEELING: CORPORATIONS ARE NOT IN PRINCIPLE
IMMUNE FROM OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court pointedly ignored the question at the heart
of the Court of Appeals’ decision and much of the public interest in the case,
namely whether corporations may in principle bear international obligations
to respect human rights norms.120 The conflict among the circuit courts,
which triggered the grant of certiorari in Kiobel, remains as trenchant as ever,
with the Second Circuit as the sole outlier among the circuit courts of
appeals in an overall consensus that corporations are not immune from inter114 See Special Rapporteur, Fourth Rep. on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut
dedere aut judicare), Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/648 (May 31, 2011) (by Zdzislaw Galicki) (reporting on the customary international law norm of aut dedere aut judicare
for crimes against humanity).
115 See Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 422, 426, 449, 451–63 (July 20).
116 Id. at 451–63.
117 Id. at 449.
118 Id.
119 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citation
omitted).
120 Id. at 1669.
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national law for purposes of the ATS.121 It is important that domestic law not
recognize a law-free zone for corporations, effectively immunizing entities
that commit or participate in serious human rights violations. International
law neither creates nor tolerates such an immunity.
First, certain egregious conduct violates international human rights standards, whether committed by state or non-state actors. Although it is true
that international criminal tribunals distinguish between natural and juristic
persons for purposes of their own jurisdiction, nothing in international law
precludes the imposition of civil or tort liability for corporate misconduct.
Thus, the proper question is not whether human rights treaties explicitly
impose liability on corporations. It is whether those treaties distinguish
between juristic and natural individuals in a way that exempts the former
from all responsibility. There is nothing in the text or context of those treaties supporting that distinction.
Second, it is wrong to conclude from the alleged absence of human
rights cases against corporations that they are exempt from human rights
norms: international law never defines the means of its domestic implementation and remediation, leaving states a wide berth in assuring that the law is
respected and enforced as each thinks best. It hardly follows that states
remain free to allow violations so long as a corporation commits the wrong.
Equally important, in adopting the ATS, Congress directed the federal courts
to allow civil actions for violations of international law that take tortious
form, without specifying the types of defendants who might be sued. As recognized by the Supreme Court, “[t]he Alien Tort Statute by its terms does
not distinguish among classes of defendants.”122 Over a century ago, the
Attorney General of the United States concluded that corporations are in
principle capable of violating the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States for purposes of the ATS.123
In determining that corporations could have no obligations under international law, the Second Circuit in Kiobel apparently felt compelled by dicta
in a footnote in Sosa,124 but nothing in Sosa requires so distorted a focus. To
the contrary, Sosa rejected the aggressive corporate immunity positions
advanced by business groups appearing as amicus curiae, reasoning only that
“the determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause
of action” is “related . . . [to] whether international law extends the scope of
121 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel, every other circuit court to address
the issue disagreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 745–46 (9th
Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15
(D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303,
1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
122 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989).
123 Mexican Boundary—Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 250 (1907)
(concluding that aliens injured by a private company’s diversion of water in violation of a
bilateral treaty between Mexico and the United States could sue under the ATS).
124 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123, 149.
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liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”125 The
Supreme Court thus distinguished those wrongs that require state action
(e.g., torture)126 from those that do not (e.g., genocide). The text shows
that the Court in Sosa was referring to a single class of non-state actors (natural and juristic individuals), not to two separate classes as assumed by the
Second Circuit panel in Kiobel.
Nor is it relevant that the Sosa Court would only recognize a cause of
action, derived from the common law, for certain violations of international
law: “The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time.”127 The ATS requires only that the tort be “committed”
in violation of a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of international law,
not that international law itself recognize a right to sue or distinguish for
purposes of civil liability between natural and juristic individuals. Authoritative interpretations of international law also establish that there is no law-free
zone for corporate actions, especially with respect to human rights obligations.128 And because corporate liability for serious harms is a universal feature of the world’s legal systems, it qualifies as a general principle of law—
one of the sources of international norms.129
Equally important, the Second Circuit approach, if made general, would
place the United States in breach of its international legal obligation to provide a meaningful remedy for violations of human rights, no matter who or
what violates them. The Second Circuit majority’s conclusions allow governments to privatize their way around their obligations under international
human rights law: the simple expedient of creating a corporation to run prisons or maintain civil order or fight wars would effectively block the imposition of liability on the entity that is directly responsible for the violation. The
Second Circuit’s approach thus conflicts with the obligation of states to pro-

125 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 & n.20 (2004).
126 It is clear in context that the Supreme Court was referring to “torture” as defined in
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Other international
instruments prohibiting torture do not have the state action requirement, including common article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the Laws of War. See, e.g., Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135.
127 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
128 See supra Section III.A.
129 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 3 Bevans 1179; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(1)(c) (1987) (“A rule of international law is one that has been
accepted as such by the international community of states . . . by derivation from general
principles common to the major legal systems of the world.”).
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vide a meaningful remedy for such abuses.130 This conclusion has already
been articulated by the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations, who noted in
2009: “As part of their duty to protect, States are required to take appropriate
steps to investigate, punish and redress corporate-related abuse of the rights
of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction—in short, to provide
access to remedy.”131
CONCLUSION
Modern litigation under the ATS replicates some of the fundamental
changes in contemporary international law. In the thirty-four years since the
Filartiga decision, some major developments in international legal thinking
have been reflected in decisions under the ATS, including, among others,
the progressive narrowing of an exclusive domestic jurisdiction, the attenuation of the distinction between state and non-state actors, the weakening of
the distinction between public international law and private international
law, and the partial blurring of the distinction between treaty and custom.
Although Kiobel suggests that there is an outer limit to ATS jurisdiction, that
decision hardly amounts to the death knell of human rights litigation under
the statute. If anything, Kiobel invites considerably more litigation than it
resolves. Perhaps, when the Supreme Court is again asked to clarify its
understanding of the Alien Tort Statute—as it inevitably will be—the substantive and the jurisdictional standards of international law in all its current
breadth will inform the Court’s disposition.

130 See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147
(Dec. 16, 2005) (“[W]here a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for
reparation to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim or compensate
the State if the State has already provided reparation to the victim.”).
131 Special Rep. of the U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 87, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009).
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